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PROBLEMS OF SURFACE DAMAGE
By

ROBERT

C.

HAWLEY Of

the Denver Bar

Robert C. Hawley; Member, Colorado and Denver Bar Association;
A.B., University of Colorado, 1953;
L.LB., Harvard University, 1949;
presently, Attorney for Continental
Oil Company and Subsidiaries.
Member of Oil and Gas Committee,
Colorado Bar Association, Junior
Bar, Committee Denver Bar Association, Rocky Mountain Oil and
Gas Association, Wyoming Petroleum Industries Committee, Wyo-

ming Stock Growers Association,
American National Cattlemen's Association.

In order to define the subject, it should be made clear that
excepting certain minor variations the context of surface damages
will be limited to those problems which occur when the person
allegedly damaging the surface is conducting operations on lands
upon which he is entitled to access by virtue of a valid oil and
gas lease. There shall be no attempts to discuss the problem of
damage to the surface of other lands or problems not directly connected with operations which might be governed in certain states
by the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher or absolute liability rather
than liability based upon negligence.
The problem of surface damages is becoming increasingly important to the Rocky Mountain Region due to the great increase
in oil activities during the past few years. Oil and gas attorneys
have experienced increased frequency with respect to surface
damage problems.
From time to time the subject has been mentioned as a matter
for federal legislation. It has been approached in one of two ways;
the surface owner should be granted by law a certain percent of
the royalty received by the mineral owner and the working interest owner. It is not believed that a conveyance of this type
would solve the problem because once the surface owner acquired
this right, there would be no restriction upon his reserving it to
himself if he conveyed the surface or conveyed the royalty to a
grantee even though he retained the surface for himself. In either
event, the resulting situation would be no different than initially.
The second proposal is that when a mineral owner leases, the
surface owner be given some interest similar to an overriding royalty during the existence of the lease. It is possible that where a
person having no interest in the mineral estate is by law granted
certain property rights belonging to the mineral owner and the
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oil operator, due process considerations may arise. Since neither
solution would be of any value to the surface owner in the absence
of production, adoption of one or the other would be only a partial
solution.
In the last session of the Wyoming Legislatuire, a bill was introduced to give the surface owner a 2 % royalty on all State
of Wyoming Oil and Gas Leases. The bill did not pass.
The Wyoming Stockgrower's Association and the Colorado
Cattlemen's Association have been very active in their efforts to
obtain some type of compensation for the surface owner. Recently, the Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association and the Wyoming Stockgrower's Association have formulated a code of ethics
under which the members of both groups are working to obtain
a "Gentlemen's Agreement" with respect to the rights and the
protection of the parties involved. An understanding of this type
will, if successful, undoubtedly do more toward solving the problem
than any other measure. Unfortunately, human passions enter
into the situation all too frequently and regardless of the initial
intention of the parties, hard feelings arise, often times resulting
in court actions and sometimes even in violence.
For a full understanding of the problem, it is well to remember
that there are two distinct and separate estates involved; (1) the
surface estate, and (2) the mineral estate. Few people would
seriously contest the right of a property owner to have access to
his property across surrounding property of another. The separate
mineral and surface estates can be compared analagously. The
mineral owner must have access upon the surface of the lands
overlying his mineral estate in order to fully realize his property.
Since a realization of such hydrocarbons is normally accomplished
by virtue of the owner granting a lease to some oil operator for
the purposes of exploration and development, the general types
of leases employed shall be considered:
(1) The Fee Lease, normally one of the various types of
"Producers 88."
(2) Federal Oil and Gas Leases which are of many types,
the differentiation between which will not be elaborated.
(3) State Oil and Gas Leases.
The typical Fee Lease usually contains the following type
clause:
"Lessee shall have the right to use, free of cost, gas, oil,
and water produced on said land for its operations thereon,
except water from wells of lessor. When requested by
lessor, lessee shall bury his pipeline below plow depth.
No wells shall be drilled nearer than 200 feet to the house
or barn now on said premises, without the written consent
of the lessor. Lessee shall pay for damages caused by its
operations to growing crops on said land. Lessee shall have
the right at any time to remove all improvements, machinery, and fixtures placed or erected by lessee on said premises, including the right to pull and remove casing."
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The first situation to be considered is that where the surface
and minerals are vested in the same person. This situation usually
does not create too much of a problem, because the lessor is quite
anxious to further the development of his property for oil and gas
purposes. Consequently he favors any necessary measures that
the lessee must take in the conduct of exploration, drilling and
producing operations. Unfortunately, there are times when even
the best of friends "fall out." This often happens when the hoped
for well is dry and the expected royalties are not forthcoming.
There are also instances in which the lessor and lessee do not get
along even though the lease may be on producing property. The
law on this particular point is brought out in a recent Texas case
decided by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.1 The lessor also
owned the surface and the lease contained a clause such as that
quoted above. The lessee periodically cleaned gas wells located
on the property by "blowing" them. On one particular occasion,
the lessee blew the gas wells and an arsenic compound was deposited on the lessor's land. The lessor brought an action for damages to grass, land, livestock and fencing. The jury awarded the
lessor a verdict of $15,000. In affirming the judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the Court held that the lessor had to prove
negligence on the part of the lessee; that there was no negligence;
that the arsenic compound was not a foreseeable consequence of
cleaning a gas well by blowing; that the operator had acted with
reasonable diligence and in a proper fashion; and that the damage
was only to grass which is not a crop.
A much more troublesome problem arises when the mineral
lessor is not the surface owner. This occurs when the mineral
estate presumably has been severed from the surface estate by
reservation or conveyance. (It is commonplace in real estate law
that more consideration is paid for a property which has been improved by sidewalks, curbs, gutters and other structures of this
type than for the same property if unimproved. This is such a
generally recognized fact that no one would argue otherwise. Yet,
if this same problem is transferred to a potentially valuable mineral property, loud repercussions are often heard.) Even in unexplored areas, mineral rights have some value, as evidenced by
the fact when a ranch is purchased with the mineral rights reserved to the grantor, the amount a purchaser pays for the property
is considerably less than it would be if the purchase included the
mineral rights. The value of minerals is often forgotten, however,
when the owner of the severed mineral estate attempts to recover
his property. The courts, however, have with great consistency
held that the mineral estate was the dominant estate and that
the owner thereof had the right to recover his property.
The rule is set forth in the California case of MacDonnell v.
Capitol Company.' In this case, the minerals had been reserved
by a prior grantor. The surface owner brought an action for
damages claiming trespass. The court denied the claim and held
that a mineral reservation is construed in favor of the grantor;
'Wohiford v. American Gas Production Co., 218 F2d 213 (1955).
130 F2d 311 (1942).
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that there is unanimity as to the rule that the minerals may be
removed even though the surface of the land may be wholly destroyed. Of course, the removal must be done in a manner consistent with proper oil field practice. This principle is also set
forth in Thornton, The Law of Oil and Gas, Vol. 1, Sec. 342.
Often, the very interesting question is asked, "How can a mineral owner as lessor enter into a contract obligation with an oil
operator as lessee under which contract the operator is granted
certain rights to the surface when the lessor does not own the
surface." The principle objective of a severed mineral owner is to
capture his mineral property. In attempting to do this there are
undoubtedly many occasions when he pays little heed to what
use is made of the surface; he will grant any privileges requested
by the operator insofar as they pertain to the use of the surface.
In Wood v. Hay,3 it was very ably argued that there was nothing
in a mineral reservation expressly giving the right to drill wells,
erect derricks, construct tanks or make use of the surface in exploring for oil and gas. In rejecting this argument, the court said,
"The right to enter and to make reasonable use of the land in
achieving in a workmanlike way, the only result the parties could
have intended must be implied from the nature of the matters
dealt with."
The argument that the mineral owner must extract his minerals
in a way which is not inconsistent with the surface use was considered in Trklja v. Keys, 4 . The California court held that there
was no basis for such a rule. Even in very unusual cases the courts
have established a pattern which can be followed with little difficulty. Among the most unusual is Vodopija v. Gulf Refining Co.,'
a decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The defendant
had been granted a Louisiana state oil and gas lease. The plaintiff had been granted a Louisiana state oyster lease. Under the
terms of the oil and gas lease, the defendant was granted privileges, "reasonably requisite" for the conduct of its operations.
The Gulf Company, in conducting offshore operations over the
ocean bottom, covered by both the oil and gas and the oyster
lease, disturbed the oyster beds and thus greatly reduced the value
of the plaintiff's lease. Plaintiff brought an action for damages.
175 S.W. 2d 190 (1943).

121 P. 2d, 54 (1942).
198

F. 2d, 344 (1952),
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The court held that the plaintiff must prove negligence and that
if the defendant conducted its oil operations in a normal manner,
there was no negligence even if damage had been done. This doctrine is carried even further in the Oklahoma case of Phillips Petroleum Company v. Sheel,6 . Three head of plaintiff's cattle were
killed by the pump jacks on the defendant's, Phillips, wells. Phillips was conducting operations under an Osage Indian lease which
contained the following language:
"During operations the lessee shall pay all damages for
the use of the surface, other than that included in tle location and tank sites, all damages to any growing crops or
any improvements on the lands and all other damages as
may be occasioned by reason of operations."
It was Sheel's contention that all other damages occasioned by
reason of operations covered the loss of his cattle. The court,
however, held that the language did not cover the loss of the
cattle. It was the court's opinion that the damages provided for
in the quoted language of the lease were only damages to crops
and improvements and that recovery could be had for the loss of
livestock only when there was proof of negligence. The language
"all other damages" was held to apply only to damages to crops
and improvements. As there was no negligence on the part of
Phillips, the operations having been conducted in a normal fashion,
no recovery was allowed. This was a reiteration of the rule previously set forth in Mid-Continent Petroleum Corporation v.
Rhodes,7 another Oklahoma case in which the plaintiff's cattle
died from drinking from a slush pit. The court denied recovery
under the provisions of the oil and gas lease on the ground that
compensation will only be allowed for damages to crops and improvements and that livestock could not be placed in either of
these categories.
The above-cited cases establish the rule that any reasonable
use may be made of the surface if it is necessary to obtain the
dominant mineral estate. What then is a reasonable use? Bordieu
8
v. Seaboard Oil Corporation,
was a case in which the California
court held that the right of a mineral lessee cannot be enlarged
by the terms of the lease. This would appear to mean that the
mineral lessee has a right only to operate on the surface and to
extract the minerals. However, this holding is no panacea but is
only the first milestone. It is assumed that the oil operator cannot go beyond the rights necessary to extract minerals and that
these rights cannot be enlarged by the lease. The ultimate question is one of defining such rights. In some jurisdictions, certain
rights are included which are specifically excluded in others. Consequently, the attorney handling a case involving surface damages
must complete the general outline by attempting to determine
what the rights include within the jurisdiction involved. The facts
in the Bordieu case were that the oil operator was using the sur*243

P2d, 726 (1952).

T240 P2d 95 (1951).
$119 P2d, 973 (1941).
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face covered by the claimant's lease as a site for processing oil
which had been produced on other leases a good distance away.
The court held that this was not a right granted in the lease and
was an attempted enlargement of such rights.
In Coffindaffer v. Hope Natural Gas Company," the West
Virginia court rendered a decision indicating what is an unreasonable use. The oil operator built a road on the premises for the
purpose of exploring and drilling for oil and gas. The road was
built in good faith. However, no well was ever drilled and, consequently, the court decided that the operator was liable for
restoring the land to the condition that it had been in prior to the
construction of the road. This case may still be the law in West
Virginia but it is extremely doubtful that it would still control
in other jurisdictions.
In the case of Yates v. The Gulf Oil Corporation,° Gulf
brought an action to restrain the surface owner for interfering with
geophysical operations on the leased premises. The lease under
which Gulf was operating had been granted in 1924 and specifically permitted mining and operating for minerals. There was
no mention made in the lease of exploration or seismographing.
In fact, seismographing was completely unknown at the time of
the execution of the lease. The surface owner contended that because the lease was silent on these points, Gulf had no right to conduct exploration or seismograph activities. The court held that
Gulf had the right to send its seismograph crews on the premises
because exploration was an implied right and was reasonably
necessary for the purpose of oil and gas operations.
As in Bordieu v. Seaboard Oil Corporation,supra, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in a case arising in Montana," held that
an oil and gas lease does not grant a right to use the premises for
operations pertaining to oil produced on other leases. In the Franz
case the lease provided that payment should be made for damages
to growing crops, fences, and other damages. The court used the
"reasonably necessary" test which has become the standard, but
allowed damages to the lessor because the lessee used a pumping station on the leased premises for operations in another field.
0 81 SE 966 (19).
10182 F2d, 286 (1950).
11Franz Corporation v. Fifer, 295 Fed. 106 (1924).
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Interestingly, the court awarded damages based on the differences in value of the land before and after the operation. Uniformly, the decisions adopt the rule of damages as set forth in
Hatch Brothers v. Black, '2 a case decided by the Wyoming Supreme Court. The measure of damages adopted is the value of the
crops at the time of destruction, with the qualification, however,
that if operations are conducted reasonably, the operator is only
liable for temporary damages to the crops. If the operations are
conducted in an unreasonable manner, the operator is liable for
the entire amount as permanent damages.
Other guides to aid us in the determination of what is an unreasonable use of the surface are Livingston v. The Texas Company,
an unreported case decided in the Federal District Court for the
District of Wyoming, in which the plaintiff sought to recover
$75,000. Judge Kennedy stated that he could not award damages
for a reasonable use of the surface but that the plaintiff would
be allowed an amount of $5,000 by virtue of the Texas Company's
leaving casing, pipe, and other waste materials on the plaintiff's
alfalfa meadows; further, the company had interferred with the
plaintiff's irrigation system. Since the system, an improvement,
had not been restored to its former state, compensation was ordered
because of the damage to it.
In Fowler v. Delaplain,"' the Ohio court held that a lease
which granted the oil operator the right to use "necessary" measures for production and removal of oil and gas, did not apply to
houses constructed by the operator for its employees on the property, because they were not necessary for operation and removal.
This holding is contra to the holding in Livingston v. Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Company,14 where the lease specifically
permitted the construction of buildings and other structures. The
Federal court held that buildings and other structures necessary
for operations included houses for employees. It might be well
argued that the distinction between the Fowler and Livingston
cases is explained by the difference in the language of the two
leases involved. However, in Joyner v. R. H. Dearing & Sons.1 5
a Texas case, the lease was silent as to any specific authorization
for construction of buildings or other structures. It was held that
the erection of a house and fence was reasonably necessary to the
full enjoyment of the right to produce oil from the premises:
consequently, the operator had this right even in the absence of
a specific authorization in the lease.
The opposing views expressed in Fowler v. Delaplain, and
Joyner v. R. H. Dearing & Sons, supra, do not upset what might
be termed as the "general rule" regarding surface operations
under fee leases. To summarize, it can be said that any measure
reasonably necessary for oil operations is permissible and that no
damages will be allowed. On the other hand, proof of negligent
conduct in the operations will result in liability and accompany- 165 P. 518, (1917).
" 87 NE 260.
1"91 Fed. 2d, 833 (1937).
134 S.W. 2d 757, (1939).
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ing damages. Damage to crops or improvements must usually
be compensated; this depends also upon the exact language of the
lease and any agreement between the parties like the oil and gas
leases executed by the Union Pacific Railroad Company.
The second type of lease to be discussed is the Federal Oil and
Gas Lease granted by the Federal Government in order that
operations may be conducted on lands under which the minerals
are owned by the United States. There were few problems in this
field until the passage of the Pickett Act in 1910. This act authorized the President of the United States to withdraw from entry
all public lands potentially valuable for oil and gas. Prior to this
time, mineral lands, or more specifically oil and gas lands, had
been open to location and acquisition under the placer mining laws.
Lands which had been opened to homestead entry had not been
burdened with mineral reservations and the homesteader, upon
successfully "proving up," acquired title to both the surface and
minerals. A new policy was embodied in the Mineral Leasing Act
of 1920, which laid the foundation for the procedure followed at
this time. In the period between the passage of the Pickett Act
in 1910, and the Mineral Leasing Act in 1920, there was a great
deal of confusion in the field of oil and gas development on federal lands due to a lack of clear cut policy. During this interim
period the Agricultural Entry Act of 1914 and the Stockraising
Homestead Act of 1916 were passed by the Congress of the United
States. Under the provisions of these, surface owners whose lands
overlaid a severed mineral estate were afforded some protection
from damage caused to their land by oil and gas operations. The
Agricultural Entry Act contained a provision that the oil and gas
lessee must secure a bond to compensate the surface owner for
damages to crops and improvements caused by prospecting. The
Act further went on to say that subsequent to prospecting the
lessee could re-enter and occupy so much of the surface as was
reasonably incident to his operations upon payment of damages
caused thereby to the surface owner. The terms of the Stockraising Homestead Act were clear in that the only payment of
damages allowed was compensation for damages to crops and
improvements. The terms of the 1914 Act gave rise to the problem
of whether or not compensation should be paid to a surface owner
Appraisals of Securities Free of Charge
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only for damages to crops and improvements or whether damages
to crops and improvements were payable as a result of prospecting operations with compensation permitted for damages of any
type if further operations were conducted.
In Kinney Coastal Oil Company v. Kieffer," the Supreme
Court of the United States resolved this question by holding that
the intent of the Agricultural Entry Act of 1914 was to provide
for damages to crops and improvements only, regardless of whether
the damages occurred in prospecting or after re-entry during conduct of other oil and gas operations. As a result of this decision,
the damage provisions of the Agricultural Entry Act of 1914 and
the Stockraising Homestead Act of 1916 were determined to be
the same. Both acts require a bond in lieu of a waiver by the surface owner or of a voluntary settlement of damages.
More recent federal legislation has gone somewhat further.
For example, the Strip and Open Pit Mining Act of 1949, makes
a mining operator liable for damages to lands used for grazing
purposes. It is doubtful that this in any way changes the situation
in regard to oil and gas operations because strip and open pit
mining operations are conducted in a completely different manner.
Another problem which arose under the Mineral Leasing Act
of 1920 was occasioned by the fact that the leases issued by the
United States granted the lessee many rights in addition to those
6277

US 488 (1927).
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which were specifically set forth in the statute. Proponents of
the argument that rights should be strictly limited to the terms
of the statute have been answered by the fact that the Mineral
Leasing Act allows the Secretary of the Interior to prescribe necessary rules and regulations and to do any and all things necessary
to carry out and accomplish the purposes of the law. Forbes v.
United States17 and United States v. Ohio Oil Company, 8 have held
that the secretary's rules and regulations should be given the effect of a statute in order fully to accomplish the purposes of the
law; therefore the rights granted to the lessee in the oil and gas
leases are valid. A contrary holding would, of course, have a tremendous effect upon almost all federal oil and gas leases. This
effect would have gone beyond the problem of surface damages.
It is of importance to the surface damage question because so
many of the rights, such as those pertaining to transportation
and storage facilities, construction of various structures, roads,
etc., directly affect the surface owner. This effect was fully brought
out in a Montana case.' 9 The question involved in this action was
whether the building of a reservoir on the surface was reasonably
incident to oil and gas operations. The mineral estate had been
severed from the surface estate; the United States was the owner
of the mineral estate and granted a lease to the oil operator.
The court disallowed the plaintiff's claim for recovery on the
grounds that there was no proof that the reservoir was unnecessary and not reasonably incident to the oil and gas operations.
A more recent case involving surface damages where the
minerals have been reserved by the United States is Holbrook v.
Continental Oil Company20 which was rendered by the Supreme
Court of Wyoming. In this case, almost all of the points which
have been raised in actions regarding surface damages were considered. The lessee had attained a valid federal oil and gas lease
covering certain Wyoming ranch lands. At the time oil operations
were commenced on the leased premises, the plaintiffs were surface lessees. During the period of oil and gas development the
plaintiffs purchased the surface as an addition to their ranch. The
following provisions were contained in the oil and gas leases
pertaining to the lessee's rights,
"right to drill for, mine, extract, remove and dispose of
all the oil and gas deposits in or under the lands, together
with the right to construct and maintain thereupon all
works, buildings, plants, waterways, roads, telephone and
telegraph lines, pipe lines, reservoir tanks, pumping stations or other structures necessary to the full enjoyment
thereof."
In the conduct of operations, the defendant constructed houses
for the use of its employees operating the lease, a battery, roads,
certain other structures, and, of course, drilled for oil. Plaintiffs
alleged that they were wrongly deprived of possession; that the
17 125 F2d 404 (1942).
18 163 F2d 633 (1947).
39 Norum v. The Queen City Oil Company, 264 P 122 (1928).
"278
P2d, 798 (1955).
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houses constructed were not necessary for the conduct of operations and that therefore they became the property of plaintiff who
was entitled to a sum equal to the rents which would have been
paid by tenants for such houses; that the oil operations destroyed
the plaintiff's integrated ranch unit; that defendants trod down
the grass crops, left oil and debris on the property, polluted the
water, destroyed the fences, left the gates open, built roads, culverts, fills and dams upon the premises, transported people and
equipment across the lands; and further, that the defendant
stored, processed and handled oil and gas produced on other lands
upon plaintiff's lands; that the plaintiffs had been deprived of
full use and enjoyment of their property and that defendant's
operations had resulted in the death of some of the plaintiff's
livestock, had destroyed plaintiff's water supply and forced plaintiff's to construct a reservoir because of this destruction of the
water supply. For these damages, plaintiff sought a sum in excess of $35,000. All of the points involved were decided in favor
of defendants and on appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming
held:
1. The construction of the houses for defendant's employees
who operated the lease on a 24-hour basis was reasonably incident
to the oil operations, the facts showing that the nearest communities were Lance Creek, a distance of six to eight miles from the
lease, and Lusk, a distance of forty-two miles from the lease;
2. That the processing of oil in the tank battery on the plaintiff's premises, which oil was produced from an adjoining lease,
the surface of which was not owned by plaintiffs was not detrimental to plaintiffs in that another portion of the surface of the
adjoining lease was owned by plaintiffs and defendants would
have had a right to construct a tank battery thereon with the
result that there could have possibly been two tank batteries consructed on the surface of plaintiff's lands rather than the one
which had been constructed; and
3. That there was no negligence in the conduct of defendant's
operations and that plaintiff's had not proved any damage to
crops and improvements which in the absence of negligence would
be their sole basis for recovery; the range grass not being a crop.
The last point as to whether native grass is a crop, which
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issue is of great importance to the Rocky. Mountain region, the
Supreme Courts of Wyoming, West Virginia, New Mexico, Texas,
Alabama and Oregon have held that various types of native
grasses are not a crop. The only authority which has been found
contrary is dictum in the Utah case of Francisv. Roberts,21 in which
the court stated "fructus industriales and fructus naturales are
comprehended within the term 'crops'." This case is, however,
of little force in that native hay was involved rather than range
grass and there was no dispute as to the fact that this hay was
harvested each year whereas range grasses are not mowed and
stacked.
Shortly after the decision in the Holbrook case supra, the
Wyoming legislature in 1955 passed the following act:
"For the purpose of interpreting the various laws of this
state, the term 'crop' or 'agricultural crop', when not otherwise defined by Statute, shall be construed to mean corn,
oats, wheat, barley, flax, sorghums and other grains, potatoes, vegetables, hay, wheat-grasses (agropyron species),
needlegrasses (stipa species), bluegrasses (poa species),
fescue grasses (festuca species), grama grasses (bouteloua
species), sedges and rushes, shrubby or woody forage plants
which include salt sages (atriplex species), sagebrushes (artemisia species), winterfat (eurotia lanata), and forage
legumes which include astragalus, lupinus and other members of the family leguminosae."
The effect of this piece of legislation is that at the present time
almost anything that grows in the state of Wyoming, including
sagebrush, is defined as a crop. Despite the language of the statute,
it is doubtful if it directly affects the Holbrook case in that the
statute applies to the many phases of Wyoming law where the
term "crop" is used without any definition thereof.
It would be a somewhat strained interpretation to apply a
definition which was designed to clarify state statutes to the
meaning of the word contained in a contract between two individual parties, especially in view of the fact that the word as
contained in such contract has been defined by a decision of the
Supreme Court of the state.
As to the third category of lease, namely the state lease, this
article shall confine itself only to a form used by the state of
Colorado.
With reference to surface damages Form 193 (Rev. 12/1954)
Colorado Oil and Gas Lease, contains the following language:
"Lessee shall be liable and agrees to pay for all damages
to the surface of the land, livestock, growing crops, or improvements caused by lessee's operations on said lands.
It is agreed and understood that no operations shall be
commenced on the lands hereinabove described unless and
until the lessee or his assignee shall have filed a good and
sufficient bond with the lessor in an amount to be fixed
by lessor, to secure the payment for such damage to the
21272 P. 633

(1928).
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surface of the land, livestock, growing crops or improvements as may be caused by lessee or his assignee's operations of said lands and also compliance with all the provisions, conditions, covenants and obligations of this lease
and the statutes of the State of Colorado, and rules and
regulations thereto appertaining. When requested by lessor,
lessee shall bury pipe lines below plow depth."
This language goes beyond the language contained in the
usual fee lease or in a federal oil and gas lease. The Colorado
Supreme Court has not ruled upon a question of liability for damages under the provisions of the state lease form. However, the
Supreme Court of New Mexico had occasion to interpret similar
language contained in a New Mexico state lease form .22 In the Tidewater case, Shipp had obtained a state oil and gas lease. The oil
operator began the conduct of seismographing operations on the
premises and the plaintiff obtained a restraining order prohibiting the conduct of such operations.
Despite the restraining order the defendant oil operator continued with the seismographing work. No damage was dorie to
any crops or improvements. However, trucks did travel over the
grazing surface of the land. The court allowed the plaintiff to recover for damage to the grazing surface and for loss of weight
incurred by his cattle which was attributed to their being disturbed by the conduct of the oil lessee's operations.
In summary, the "so called" general rule may be said to be
that the owner of the dominant mineral estate may use any means
reasonably necessary or reasonably incident to obtain the benefits of his estate, and that in the absence of negligence, he will
not be liable for any damage caused to the surface owner unless
such damages are provided for in the lease contract. Therefore,
an understanding and an agreement upon the terms of the lease
contract are of vital importance. This, coupled with a genuine
desire on the part of the parties involved to act in strict accordance with business ethics and to conduct their activities in a manner which will interfere with the activities of the owner of the
other estate in the least possible way, will do more than any other
measure to alleviate the problem of surface damages.
e Tidewater v. Shipp, 278 P2d, 571 (1955).
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The broad scope of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 encompasses a number of significant changes in the estate and gift tax
provisions. In this article, the Estate and Gift Tax Committee of
the Section of Taxation of the American Bar Association will present a brief outline of these changes for the benefit of the general
practitioner who does not specialize in these fields. Unfortunately,
even at this writing (some twenty months after adoption of the
1954 Code) the Treasury Department has not issued the estate
and gift tax regulations, even in tentative form, so many of the
problems inherent in the new statutory language can only be raised
and not solved. It is expected that the tentative regu]ations will
be published in the spring of this year.
I. ESTATE TAX
A. Basic and Additional Tax Combined. (Sections 2001 and
2011, new Code; Sections 810 and 935, old Code). As an historical
legacy, the estate tax liability for many years was computed in
two parts; first, the so-called "tentative tax," which in fact might
well have been called the "real" tax; and second, if the net estate
exceeded $100,000, then the so-called "basic estate tax" was computed. An amount constituting 80% of this basic estate tax was
the maximum credit allowed for death taxes paid to the several
states.
Now, this procedure has been simplified by eliminating the
necessity for the separate computation of the basic estate tax. The
estate tax is computed under Section 2001 and a credit for state
death taxes is allowed, based on computations under Section 2011.
However, the new method does not change the tax rates, and the
credit for state death taxes is still the same amount.
B. Credit for Tax on Prior Transfers. (Section 2013, new Code;
Section 812(c), old Code). The 1939 Code permitted a deduction
for property received from a prior decedent (or by a gift subject
to gift tax) within five years of the death of the current decedent.
In order to obtain this deduction for previously taxed property,
it was necessary that the property be still in the possession of the
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current decedent, or that the property in the current decedent's
estate could be traced from the former decedent's property. Further,
the deduction was reduced if the property was subject to a debt
or claim, and- subsequent to the adoption of the marital deduction provisions in 1948, no deduction for property previously taxed
was allowed on transfers between spouses. Also, the amount of
the deduction was independent of the amount of the tax which
was paid on the prior transfer.
To eliminate the complications and inequities of the prior law,
the new Code adopts a different approach. In lieu of the deduction
for property previously taxed, a credit is permitted for the tax paid
on the property in the estate of the prior decedent, provided that
this credit may never be larger than if the current decedent had
not received the property. The credit is based on the value of
the property at the time of the death of the prior decedent.
It is important to note that property transferred between
spouses to the extent that no marital deduction is available is now
eligible for this credit, and this alleviates to a certain extent qualifying more property for the marital deduction than one-half of
the decedent's adjusted gross estate.
A full credit is allowed if both decedents died within a twoyear period of time. The credit decreases by 20% every two years
thereafter until there is no credit if the decedents die more than
ten years apart. For example, if the first decedent died in 1953 and
the second decedent dies in 1956, an 80% credit is allowed in the
second estate; if, on the other hand, the first decedent had died in
1951, then the credit in the second estate is only 60%.
The credit for gift tax paid on a prior transfer was omitted in
the 1954 Code.
C. Transfers Taking Effect at Death. (Section 2037, new Code;
Section 811 (c), old Code). Since the amendments made to Section
811 (c) of the 1939 Code by the Technical Changes Act of 1949
(October, 1949), property irrevocably transferred by a decedent
during his lifetime was includible in his gross estate as a transfer
taking effect at death, if the possession or enjoyment of the property could be obtained by the donee only by surviving the decedent.
Example: A transfers property in trust to pay the income to
B until A's death, and then to pay the principal to C, if living,
otherwise to D. Under the pre-1954 Code law, all of such prop-
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erty was swept into A's gross estate, even though A had no retained or reversionary interest in the property whatsoever, the
fact that A's life was a measuring stick being sufficient to attract
the tax on the entire property.
Section 2037 contains a second condition which must be met
before the tax will apply, namely, that the decedent has at the
time of his death a reversionary interest in the property transferred exceeding 5 per cent of the value of the property. In other
words, even though the decedent's life is a measuring stick, no
tax will result unless there is at least one chance in twenty that
the property will revert to the decedent, either under the express
terms of the instrument of transfer, or by operation of law.
The value of the decedent's reversionary interest in such
cases is determined by the usual methods of valuation, including
the use of mortality tables and actuarial principles. Such determination is made, of course, without regard to the fact of the
decedent's death.
D. Annuities. (Section 2039, new Code; no provision in old
Code). Decisions under the 1939 Code created uncertainty as to
whether the value of the survivorship rights in a joint and survivor annuity were subject to estate tax on the death of the purchaser of the annuity. The statute now specifically provides that
a joint and survivor annuity will be taxed in the gross estate of
the deceased annuitant, but only to the extent that the decedent
contributed to its cost. Payments made by an employer under a
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qualified pension, profit-sharing or retirement plan are not considered as having been made by the decedent, and therefore the
portion of the annuity purchased by the employer's contributions
in such cases escapes the estate tax.
An income tax deduction is granted (Section 691 of the 1954
Code) to the surviving annuitant who reports the income, such
deduction being equal to the estate tax attributable to the income
element of the survivorship feature which has accrued since the
annuity was purchased.
E. Proceeds of Life Insurance. (Section 2042, new Code; Section
811(g), old Code). Since 1941, the old Code provided that the
proceeds of insurance on a decedent's life were subject to Federal estate tax on his death if either (1) the proceeds were payable to his executor, or (2) the proceeds were payable to other
named beneficiaries, if the decedent either paid the premiums
directly or indirectly, or if the decedent possessed the incidents
of ownership in the policy at his death.
By far the most important (and controversial) estate tax
change is the complete elimination of the premium payment test.
Ownership of the policy is now made the sole criterion of taxability. The incidents of ownership in the policy include the right
to change beneficiaries, to assign, surrender or borrow on the
policy, to receive dividends, etc.
The 5% reversionary interest rule discussed above has now
been made applicable to transfers of life insurance policies. The
rules for valuing such reversionary interests are similar to those
used under Section 2037.
Several interesting questions have arisen with respect to the
new law, where the decedent who originally owned the policy
has made a gift thereof during his lifetime. These questions have
given rise to a great deal of discussion in print and otherwise,
and it is generally hoped that the forthcoming Treasury regulations will clarify most of the questionable points.
For example, does the assignor's right to inherit from the
assignee, or the assignor's expectancy under the assignee's will
constitute a reversionary interest:under the 5% rule? Suppose a
husband, age 60, makes an outright assignment of an insurance
policy to his wife, age 55. Since the chances of the husband's
surviving the wife are better than one in twenty, will the fact
that the husband is the wife's heir under state law, or that he
has a statutory right, such as dower or in lieu of dower, in her
estate, or the fact that he may be a beneficiary under her will,
be held to be a reversionary interest? Although, generally speaking, a right of inheritance or expectancy is not a "reversionary
interest" in the property law, there is some peculiar language in
Section 2042, which is susceptible of a contrary interpretation for
tax purposes. While most authorities are firmly of the belief
that the right of inheritance or expectancy does not constitute
a reversionary interest under this Section, the Treasury Department may not take such a favorable view of its regulations, since
it may feel, as others do, that the new law has gone too far in
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completely eliminating the premium payment test.
The contemplation of death provisions of Section 2035 further complicate and cloud the estate tax results of transfers of
life insurance. Where the assignment of the policy occurs within
the three-year period immediately prior to the death of the insured, the proceeds are presumed to be included in his estate
as a transfer in contemplation of death, and although such presumption is rebuttable, the chances of success are rather slim,
in view of the fact that life insurance, by its very nature, is testamentary in character. Where the assignee has paid the premiums subsequent to the transfer of the policy, it would seem that
the proceeds of insurance attributable to the premiums paid by
him should be excluded from the gross estate even though the
transfer was held to be in contemplation of death. Assume that
the decedent continues to pay the premiums after the transfer,
including the premiums in the three-year period prior to his death.
Presumably these premiums within the three-year presumptive
period will be included in his estate, and it can be argued that
a part, or possibly all, of the proceeds can be brought back into
the estate by reason of the payment of these premiums. In other
words, it is not advisable for the insured to continue to pay the
premiums, so long as the law is in its present uncertain state.
A third question arises, again with respect to the revisionary
interest rule. The reversionary interest rule comes into play only
"if the value of such reversionary interest exceeded 5% of the
value of the policy immediately before the death of the decedent."
Query: What is the value for this purpose of a term policy which
has no cash surrender value and only a nominal, if any, cash
reserve?
F. Expenses, Indebtedness and Taxes. (Section 2053, new
Code; Section 812 (b), old Code). Funeral and administration expenses, claims against the estate and mortgages were deductible
under the 1939 Code, but the deductions were limited to expenses
allowable by the local law where the estate was administered.
Moreover, such deductions could not exceed the value of the decedent's probate estate-that is, the value of his property subject
to creditors' claims. If the assets were in a trust, or if property
was held in joint tenancy, then the expenses paid out of such trust
assets or joint tenancy property were not deductible to the extent
that they exceeded the probate estate.
Section 2053 now provides that these items are deductible without limitation, except that to -the extent that these items exceed
the probate estate they must be paid within fifteen months from the
date of death. For example, if the decedent's estate consists solely
of joint tenancy property, all funeral expenses, debts, administration expenses and other claims paid from such property will now
constitute an allowable deduction if paid within the fifteen-month
period.
Also, the new Code permits the deduction of expenses of administering property included in the gross estate but not in the
probate estate, if such expenses are paid within fifty-one months
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from the date of death. Examples of this type of expense would
be trustee commissions paid with respect to a trust which is included in the gross estate and attorney fees incurred in contesting the inclusion of such trust in the decedent's gross estate.
G. Marital Deduction. (Section 2056, new Code; Section
812 (e), old Code). The provisions of the 1939 Code with respect
to the so-called "marital deduction trust" are familiar to everyone.
Under these rules, a transfer of property from one spouse to another in trust qualified for the marital deduction if the surviving
spouse had the right to receive all of the income of the trust and,
in addition, had a general power of appointment under the entire
trust. However, a legal life estate coupled with a power to appoint
or consume did not qualify for the marital deduction, and several
recent decisions (e.g. Estate of Hoffenberg vs. Commissioner, 223
Fed. 2d 470 (2d Cir.) affirming 22 T.C. 1185) have held that the
receipt of only part of the trust income or the power to appoint
only part of the trust principal also failed to satisfy the statute.
Both of these matters have been cleared up by the 1954 Code. Legal
life estates have been placed on a parity with trust interests and
a part of a trust can now be qualified for marital deduction. Note,
however, that these changes were not made retroactive.
H. Stocks Situated in the United States. (Section 2104, new
Code; Section 862, old Code). The former law provided that shares
of stock held by nonresident aliens were subject to estate tax
where such stock was either in a domestic corporation or in a
foreign corporation and the stock certificates were physically located in the United States. Now, only stock in a domestic corporation will be taxed in the estate of a nonresident alien. This
rule conforms to tax conventions entered into by the United States
with numerous foreign countries and now makes it possible for
banks and other organizations in the United States to serve as
depositories for stocks of foreign corporations.
I. Conclusions. The changes made by the 1954 Code with respect
to the Federal estate tax were substantial, and although not numerous, were, without exception, favorable to the taxpayer. The
changes with respect to life insurance will have particularly widespread application to literally millions of taxpayers.
II. GIFT TAX
A. Gifts to Minors. (Section 2503(c), new Code; no provision
in old Code). The familiar $3000 annual gift tax exclusion is not
applicable to all gifts, but only to those which escape the classification of a "future interest." Prior to the adoption of the 1954
Code there was considerable uncertainty as to the application of
the term "future interest" to gifts to minors, and particularly to
transfers made in trust for the benefit of minors.
While Congress did not see fit to attack the general problem
of "future interests", it did delineate, in Section 2503 (c), a certain
type of gift which was entitled to the $3000 annual exclusion.
This new statute provides that any transfer (whether in trust 01
otherwise) for the benefit of a minor does not constitute a future
interest if the property and the income therefrom may be ex-
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pended by or for the benefit of the minor prior to his reaching
21, and, to the.extent not expended prior to majority, will pass
to the beneficiary when he reaches 21, or, if he dies prior to 21,
will pass to his estate, or as he may appoint under a general power
of appointment.
While this provision represents some improvement over the
former law, it has a number of unfortunate features, notably, its
requirement for outright distribution to the child at age 21, which
requirement will run contrary to the wishes of most donors.
Further, there are a number of traps lurking in the statutory language for the unwary draftsman. There is already pressure for
amendments to this provision.
Section 2503 (b) contains a minor provision intended to eliminate the incongruous results of certain court decisions (notably,
Evans vs. Commissioner, 198 Fed. 2d 435), which held that although the ordinary gift in trust of the present right to receive
income was a present interest qualifying for the annual exclusion,
nevertheless, where the trustee had power to pay over trust principal to the income beneficiary, the income interest could not be
valued, and therefore the entire gift had to be treated as a future
interest.
B. Revaluation of Gifts for Prior Years. (Section 2504(c),
new Code; no provision in old Code). The gift tax for the current
year is often dependent on the value of gifts made in prior years.
This new provision insures that the value of a gift as reported in
a prior year will be conclusive in determining the tax in a subsequent year, if the statute of limitations has run on the prior year
return and a tax was paid in such prior year.
The reason behind this new provision is the feeling that once
the value of a gift has been accepted for tax purposes by both
the Government and the taxpayer, that value should bind both in'
determining the tax to be applied to later gifts. Thus the Commissioner is prevented (as was sometimes his wont under the
old Code) from reopening the question of the value of prior
gifts where the statute of limitations has run. Note, however,
that only valuation questions were put to rest by this provision.
C. Tenancies by the Entirety. (Section 2515, new Code; no
provision in old Code). Formerly, the creation of a joint tenancy
or a tenancy by the entirety between a husband and wife could
result in a taxable gift from one to the other, and the termination
of such tenancy could also result in a taxable gift.
Section 2515 eliminates this trap in part by providing that
unless the spouse who furnishes the major part of the consideration elects otherwise (by filing a gift tax return), a transfer of
real property in joint tenancy with right of survivorship or in
tenancy by the entirety is not a taxable gift between husband and
wife. When such tenancy is terminated, however, it will be a
gift at that time, to the extent that the proceeds are divided other
than in proportion to the original consideration furnished by each
spouse.
Transfers of personal propery in joint tenancy or tenancy by
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the entirety between spouses and transfers of all types of property
where third persons are involved are not within the protection
of the statute.
D. Property Settlements Incident to Divorce. (Section 2516,
new Code; no provision in old Code). Several years ago, the Supreme Court held that transfers of property under divorce property settlements were not taxable gifts if the terms of the settlement were incorporated in the decree of divorce. Harris vs. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106.
Under Section 2516, transfers between a husband and wife
which are made as a part of a divorce settlement are relieved of
gift tax where the husband and wife enter into a written agreement relative to their marital and property rights, and a divorce
occurs within two years thereafter. This is so, whether or not
such an agreement is actually approved by the divorce decree.
Under the estate tax law, it has been held (Commissioner vs.
Maresi, 2d Cir., 156 Fed. 2d 929) that a claim against a decedent's
estate arising out of a divorce settlement is allowable as an estate
tax deduction only if the terms of the settlement were incorporated in the divorce decree. In this respect, the estate tax treatment differs from that now provided by Section 2516.
E. Marital Deduction. (Section 2523, new Code; Section
1004(a) (3), old Code). In order to correlate the gift tax and the
estate tax, changes in the gift tax marital deduction were adopted,
similar to those discussed in paragraph I-G above.
F. Nonresident Aliens. (Section 2501, new Code; Section
1000(a), old Code). Transfers of intangible property by nonresident aliens who are not engaged in business in the United States
are now exempted from gift tax, even though such property is
physically located in the United States.
The Estate and Gift Tax Committee of the Section of Taxation has been carefully examining these new provisions and has
under consideration a number of possible additions and improvements thereto. The Committee would welcome suggestions from
practitioners generally for legislative changes which would improve the estate and gift tax laws. Further, the Committee urges
all practitioners to study the forthcoming regulations when they
are published, and to advise the Treasury Department of their
comments and criticisms. In so doing, the members of the Bar
can be of material assistance to the Congress and the Treasury
Department.
The University of Denver College of Law has in its excellent
Law Library a centralized group of Law Reviews representing all
sections of the United States. The use of this centralized collection
is available at all times to all members of the Bar and the College
of Law has cordially extended an invitation to the profession to
use the facilities of the Law Library with respect to the collection
of Law Reviews and all other reference materials available.
Arnold M. Chutkow, Editor
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Since the Constitutional Amendment was adopted in Colorado
last fall which now gives the Public Utilities Commission control
over commercially operated motor vehicles in home rule towns and
cities, many inquiries have arisen as to the procedure for obtaining
authority to operate.
Prior to January 1, 1955, when a motor vehicle was operated
solely within a home rule town or city, no authority from the
P.U.C. was necessary. Since that date, all such truck operators,
whether hauling their own merchandise, or goods belonging to
others, must obtain, in addition to their city license, a certificate
of authority from the P.U.C. How do "permits" and "certificates"
differ? What type of authority should be applied for? What is the
procedure? How is authority obtained to operate in intrastate
commerce?
As far as motor vehicles for hire are concerned, the authority
of the Public Utilities Commission now extends to their operation
not only throughout the state, but also when operated entirely
within a home rule city or town. Such vehicles are considered
public utilities.
Permits
A "permit" is a form of limited operating authority issued to
a private or contract carrier under which the carrier cannot hold
himself out as being ready, willing and able to serve the general
public. There are three types of permit:
(1) "Class A Private Carriers shall embrace all private
carriers by motor vehicle operating over substantially
regular or established routes or between substantially
fixed termini; or to a fixed terminus or termini.
(2) "Class B Private Carriers shall embrace all private
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carriers by motor vehicle who do not operate over
substantially regular or established routes or between
substantially fixed termini."'
(3) A commercial carrier, ("M" permit holder), means
any person or corporation operating a motor vehicle
transporting property sold or to be sold by him, or in
furtherance of its own private commercial enterprise;
or property of which such person or corporation is the
owner or lessee, whether the property is transported
points or over established routes, or
between fixed
2
otherwise.

Comparing the three permits, an "A" permit holder can transport commodities for hire for a limited number of specifically
named customers with whom he holds a contract, over regular
routes between fixed termini; a "B" permit holder can transport
commodities for hire for a limited number of specifically named
customers with whom he holds a contract, over irregular routes
where there are no fixed termini; an "M" permit holder, or commercial carrier, (formerly known as a "C" permit holder) can
transport his own goods anywhere in intrastate commerce, whether
or not over fixed routes.
Procedures for Obtaining A and B Permits
The application to the Public Utilities Commission for such a
permits must set forth, among other things, a statement of the
area or routes to be served, the names of all motor vehicle common
carriers with whom applicant will likely compete, and a statement
of the names and addresses of all persons whom applicant proposes
to serve.
The application is set for formal hearing before the P.U.C.
and notice is mailed out by the P.U.C. about ten days before the
hearing to all those common carriers who might be affected by
the granting of the application. These notices are sent not only to
those common carriers named in the application, but also other
common carriers with whom the Commission feels the applicant
is likely to be in competition.
Although the notice of the hearing is not usually sent to other
competing private carriers, the latter, if they learn of the hearing,
may appear at the hearing and are generally allowed to protest the
application, but only as a member of the public.
The carrier, even if his application is not protested, will not
be granted original authority, or allowed to extend his existing
authority, "if the Commission shall be of the opinion, after hearing, that the proposed operation will impair the efficient public
service of any authorized motor vehicle common carrier or carriers then. adequately serving the same territory over the same
general highway route or routes."
The applicant, at the hearing, first testifies as to his finances,
equipment, and experience, if any, as a carrier, and also as to the
customers' needs for such service. He usually has shipper witnesses, representing those named in his application, if any, to tes11953 C.R.S. Vol. 5, Chap. 115-11-1.
:1955 Session Laws (Senate Bill No. 301).
5"Rules and Regulations Governing Private Carriers for Hire by Motor Vehicle"
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tify as to their need for the particular type of service to be granted
by the applicant. The protestants-other competing carriersmay then testify individually that no additional carrier service is
needed, giving reasons. The application is granted only if it will
not impair the efficient public service of any authorized common
carrier.
An "A" or "B" permit cannot be transferred until formal application is made to the Commission and a hearing held. It must
be shown at the hearing that the transferee is qualified, financially
and otherwise, to conduct the operation.
An "A" or "B" permit holder is not allowed to advertise for
new customers. He is restricted to the customers named in his application, and such others as may be added subsequently with the
consent of the Commission.
Procedure for Obtaining M Permit for a
Commercial Carrier
No hearing whatsoever is necessary to obtain an "M" permit to
operate in intrastate commerce. It is merely necessary to file an
application with the P.U.C.4 , which sets forth, among other things,
whether the applicant intends to operate over a regular route, or
whether a limited area, and if so, a description thereof. A liability
insurance policy must also be filed with the Commission.
This permit cannot be transferred without the consent of the
Commission.
Certificates
"Certificates," as distinguished from permits, are only granted
by the P.U.C. to common carriers. What distinguishes a common
carrier is his ability to serve the public generally and indiscriminately within the geographical area prescribed by the Commission.
He can advertise for new customers, whom he can serve within
this area. He is obligated to serve every customer who requests
his services within the limit of his ability. He may be considered
a common carrier even though he is transporting only one commodity, such as livestock.
Procedure for Obtaining Certificate
A "certificate of public convenience and necessity," which is
the full technical name, is far more difficult to obtain than a
'See

"Rules

and Regulations Governing Commercial Carriers by Motor Vehicle."
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permit. The procedure, however, is substantially the same. An
application is filed with the Commission,5 which should set forth
the area or points to be served and the proposed time schedule,
if any. It should give the names of all other carriers, including
railroads, with whom applicant is likely to compete, and a statemtit of all facts and circumstances showing public convenience
and necessity. Notices of a hearing are sent to all carriers who
may be affected by the application, and the matter is set for formal hearing.
Presently established carriers of the same commodities and
operating in the area sought by the applicant are naturally anxious
to protect their own certificates, or operating rights, and frequently oppose the application. The applicant must prove to the Commission "that the present or future public convenience and necessity require, or will require, such operation."' This means, in efservice
fect, that there must be a definite need for a transportation
for which no reasonably adequate public service exists. 7 The public convenience and necessity is the criterion, rather than the applicant's personal desire, and there must be a showing that existing transportation facilities are inadequate or unsatisfactory. If
existing carrier service is adequate or can be made adequate, new
certificates will not be granted.' The Commission has taken
the position that duplication leads to waste, and competition
is not necessary to secure reasonable rates, since rates for many
types of both common carriers and private carriers may be prescribed by the Commission.'" The burden of proof is1 on the applicant to establish the inadequacy of existing service."
Transfer of Certificates
The procedure for the transfer of a common carrier certificate
of public convenience and necessity is substantially the same as
that for a private carrier permit. Notices are mailed to interested
competing carriers, and the matter set for hearing, at which time
the Commission inquires as to the terms and conditions of transfer,
financial condition and experience of the transferee, and evidence of possible abandonment of operating rights.
Differences Between Permit and Certificate
Some of the essential differences between a common carrier
certificate and a private carrier permit have been enumerated by
our Colorado Supreme Court in the case of McKay vs. Public Utilities Commission 2 as follows:
"The legislative intent is clear, that the authorization
of private carriers shall not be detrimental, within the
limits of the law, to common-carrier operation. No permit
as a private carrier can be granted by the commission if
:See "Rules and Regulations Governing Common Carriers by Motor Vehicle."
e1953 C.R.S. Vol. 5, Chap. 115-9-4.
160 C.J.S. Sec. 90, P. 289 Lt seq.
Pond on Public Utilities, Vol 3, 3rd Ed. Sec. 714, P. 1436.
aApplication of Roybal, Dec. 31591.
. 0Application of Lemmon, Dec. 27284.
I Application of Hellesen & Thompson, Dec. 26354.
IApplication of Foster, Dec. 26113.
'e104 Colo. 402 (at 413)
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in its opinion, based upon proper evidence, such privatecarrier operation impairs the efficient public service of an
authorized common carrier serving the same territory or
over the same highway or routes. All this indicates an intent to coordinate motor transportation in such a way as to
preserve common-carrier operation and to not impair the
integrity of state regulation of common-carrier service.
That this is in the public interest cannot be questioned,
especially when we have in mind the difference in legal
obligations as applied to common carriers and private
carriers. The obligations of a common carrier to the public
are different. A common carrier has the duty of giving adequate and sustained public service at reasonable rates,
without discrimination. Any failure in that respect makes
it civilly liable. Liability as to loss and damage owing to
negligence is of a higher degree than that of a private carrier. A private carrier is liable only for mere negligence.
A common carrier is held to the highest degree of care.
The purpose of the legislative intent to protect the integrity of regulatory power over common carriers is therefore
apparent. The exercise of regulatory power is primarily
in the public interest. A greater degree of service is required from the common carrier; hence, the legislative direction that no permit to a private carrier should be granted if it impairs the efficient public service of an authorized
common carrier."
Carriers Operating Entirely Within a Home Rule
Town or City
A carrier by motor vehicle, as previously stated, must now
have authority (a permit or certificate) from the P.U.C., even
though operating entirely within a home rule town or city. This
is so even though the authority which had been issued to him by
the P.U.C. before January 1, 1955, included authority to operate
within the home rule city, such as "to operate as a common carrier
by motor vehicle within the City and County of Denver, and
within the Counties of Adams and Arapahoe." The reason an application for authority to operate in Denver would now be necessary is that the P.U.C. had no authority to grant the right to operate
in Denver prior to January 1, 1955, and its actions in doing so are
void. Since it now must authorize the right to operate within a
Colorado home rule city, a new petition must be filed for such
authority.
The application for such authority should set forth the type
of commodity to be transported; whether the applicant has already
been engaged in hauling it and for how long; whether a certificate
or permit is being sought; whether applicant has held a license
from the city as a hauler; and a description of his equipment. If
the applicant has been engaged in the same type of hauling as
sought in the application, in the home rule city before January 1,
1955, the P.U.C. would probably grant him the authority without
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the necessity for shipper witnesses under so-called "grandfather
rights." If, after January 1, 1955, the applicant has transported
some new commodity, or presently desires to do so, he must show
"public convenience and necessity," and should arrange for the
testimony of shipper witnesses.
Conclusion
An attorney, in applying to the Public Utilities Commission,
should first decide very definitely what type of authority to seek.
If a permit would be satisfactory, do not apply for a certificate,
since a certificate might not be granted due to opposition from
opposing carriers, whereas a permit to haul for specified customers
might be granted.
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Article I of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States provides that, "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech." Generally, the First Amendment requires
that one be permitted to believe what he will and to advocate what
he will unless there is a "clear and present danger" that a substantial public evil will result therefrom.' The states, on the other
hand, by virtue of the "police power" doctrine have the inherent
right to preserve their own sovereignty.2 Our studied inquiry here
is as to which shall give way when a clash occurs between an
individual asserting his constitutional right of "freedom of speech"
and a state asserting its right to act for the common weal of its
citizens under its internal police powers. From the variegated
court precedents set forth in this paper, our further effort will be
to attempt to set forth guiding formulae for the courts in their role
as supreme judicial arbiters in the constant struggle between the
contestants of constitutional free speech and state police power.
'Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919).
'New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. (U. S.) 138 (1837).

DICTA

May-June, 1956

In view of the immensity of the subject, the direct and circumscribed area of this paper will be limited to the states of
California and New York. Obliquely, we will refer to legislation
and cases of other states, in addition to decisions of the United
States Supreme Court. On warrantable occasions, statutes and
ordinances will be set forth, and pertinent portions of noteworthy
opinions will be quoted verbatim.
It is well to note at this point that the line of demarcation
that exists between the Federal guarantee of free speech and the
State's police power is not a clearly defined one. In fact, it would
be more appropriate to state that the line is a very nebulous one
wherein the courts have constantly found themselves figuratively
situated between "Scylla and Charybdis." In this struggle, many
strong majority opinions are written; but very rarely without
equally vigorous dissenting ones.
The earliest attempt to invoke the aid of the Supreme Court
of the United States against state action in suppressing free speech
was brought about in the case of Patterson v. Colorado,' wherein
it was charged that certain articles and a cartoon that were published reflected upon the motives and the conduct of the Supreme
Court of Colorado in cases still pending and were intended to embarrass the Court in the impartial administration of justice. The
Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Mr. Justice
Holmes, held that this was purely a matter of local law with
which the Court would not interfere.
The next attempt took place in the case of Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commissioner of Ohio4 wherein the complainant was engaged in the business of purchasing, selling and
leasing of motion picture films. Under an Ohio statute, complainant
was compelled to submit his films for approval to the board of
censors. Despite the contention of complainant that the statute
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution,
the Supreme Court of the United States sustained the State's contention that it was engaged in a valid exercise of its police power.
In Fox v. State of Washington, defendant was convicted of
the crime of editing printed matter tending to encourage and advocate disrespect for law contrary to a Washington statute. The
article entitled "The Nude and the Prudes" advocated the right
to bathe in the nude and to boycott those who interfered with this
right. In sustaining the conviction, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that it had nothing to do with the wisdom
of the state act and the prosecution of the defendant thereunder.
It stated that it was only concerned whether the staute was repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.
In Gilbert v. Minnesota, the defendant was convicted of violating a Minnesota statute which made it unlawful to interfere
with or discourage the enlistment of men in the military forces.
The United States was then at war with Germany when the de8 205
'236
'236
'254

U.
U.
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U.

S.
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454
230
273
325

(1907).
(1915).
(1915).
(1920).
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fendant used disparaging language to discourage enlistment in
the armed forces. Again, the Supreme Court of the United States
held that the statute was valid, as the state under its "police power"
had the power to preserve its internal peace. In a notable dissenting opinion, Justice Brandeis brought to light for the first time,
the novel idea that freedom of speech under the First Amendment
is protected under the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment
by the states. Concretely, the liberty of speech is a type of freedom which under the Fourteenth Amendment no state may abridge.
Such then is the early background of the clash between the
individual's right of freedom of speech under the First Amendment and the States' assertion of police power under Justice
Taney's opinion in the Miln case. 7 Obviously the aforementioned early cases indicate a certain studied aloofness on the part
of the Supreme Court which obliquely suggests that it would be
inclined to permit a gnawing away of the individual's freedom of
speech under the First Amendment when opposed by the States'
cry of "internal police power." The matter, however, does not
rest here as we shall further see in the workings of the judicial
processes in subsequent cases that came before the courts in the
states of California and New York; and which in many instances
were taken up before the highest tribunal of the land.
CALIFORNIA
In re Hartman,8 petitioners were convicted of violating a
Los Angeles ordinance which made it unlawful to display or have
in one's possession within the City of Los Angeles, any flag, insignia or emblem whatsoever representative of any nation, sovereignty or society which espoused principles or theories of government antagonistic to the Constitution and Laws of the United
States.
In reversing the lower court and discharging the petitioners
from custody, the Supreme Court of California held that the ordinance was invalid as it deprived petitioners of their constitutional
right to join an organization advocating peaceable changes in our
laws or form of government, and their right to adopt and display
an emblem or insignia signifying such purpose.
In Whitney v. People of the State of California, the defendant
7 Footnote 2, supro.

e 182 Cal. 447 (1920).
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was convicted of violating the California Criminal Syndicalism
Act" in that she did willfully and feloniously organize and assist in organizing and knowingly became a member of a group
assembled to advocate, teach and aid in the overthrow of the government by force and violence and establishment of a working
class government. The facts show that the defendant, a woman
nearing sixty, a Wellesley graduate long distinguished in philanthropic causes, became a member of the Communist Labor Party
of California and took an active part in its proceedings. She was
elected an alternate member of the State Executive Committee
and attended its meetings. Defendant contended that it was not her
intention that the Communist Labor Party be an instrument of
terror and violence; that all intemperate policies were adopted
over her protest, and that her mere presence in the convention,
however violent the opinions expressed therein, could not thereby
become a crime. She maintained that the proceedings amounted
to a denial of due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment and that therefore the statute was repugnant
to the Federal Constitution.
The judgment of conviction was affirmed by the District Court
of Appeal. 10 In sustaining the conviction, the Supreme Court of
the United States held" that the act was sufficiently clear to satisfy the requirements of due process and did not in any way violate the equal protection clause as it affected all alike who came
within its terms and did the things prohibited. The Court said:
"We cannot hold, that as here applied, the act is an
unreasonable or arbitrary exercise of the police power of
the state, unwarrantably infringing any right of free
speech, assembly or association, or that those persons are
protected from punishment by the due process clause who
abuse such rights by joining and furthering an organization thus menacing the peace and welfare of the state."
In a dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Brandeis on the basis
of which the Governor of California pardoned Miss Whitney
shortly thereafter, the memorable language there used is here
quoted for its poignancy and terseness:
"Those who won our independence by revolution were
not cowards. They did not fear political change. They did
not exalt order at the cost of liberty. To courageous, selfreliant men with confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning applied through the processes of popular
government, no danger flowing from speech can be deemed
clear and present unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is
an opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to
avert the evil by processes of education, the remedy to
be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an
emergency can justify repression. Such cannot be the rule
0o57
Deering's Calif. Gen. Laws, Act 8428, Stats. 1919, p. 281.
Cal. App. 449 (1922).
"274

U. S. 357 (1927).
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if authority is to be reconciled with freedom. Such in my
opinion is the command of the Constitution. It is therefore
always open to Americans to challenge a law abridging
free speech and assembly by showing that there was no
emergency justifying it."
Although Miss Whitney was not exonerated by the Supreme
Court, a blow was struck for freedom of speech in that Justice
Brandeis' view of the limited powers of state legislatures to curtail free speech was adopted by the majority as opposed to their
in the case of Gitlow v. People of the State of
former indications
2
New York.

-

On February 3d, 1930, President Hoover appointed Charles
Evans Hughes as Chief Justice of the United States to fill the
vacancy created by the resignation of Chief Justice Taft. Soon
thereafter a new trend toward the question of freedom of speech
became astonishingly clear. For what had formerly been the isolated views of Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis were becoming the views of the majority of the Supreme Court. The case of
Stromberg v. California'" became the starting point of this new
trend.
In that case, the defendant was charged under a California
penal statute" with displaying a red flag in a meeting place as
12268 U. S. 652 (1925).
1283 U. S. 359 (1931).
'a Penal Code, Sec. 403-a, Deering's Penal Code of California.
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a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organized government;
or, as an invitation or stimulus to anarchistic action; or, as an
aid to propaganda of a seditious character. These three purposes
were alleged conjunctively in the information. The facts show that
defendant was a member of the Young Communist League, an
organization affiliated with the Communist Party. The charge
against her concerned a daily ceremony at a children's camp in
which defendant supervised and directed the children in a raised
red flag ceremony, the flag being a reproduction of the flag of
Soviet Russia. In the ceremony a pledge to the "worker's red
flag," was recited.
The defendant contended that under the Fourteenth Amendment the statute was invalid as being an unwarranted limitation
on the right of free speech.
The Appellate Court expressed doubt as to the validity of the
first clause of the statute stating that "opposition to organized
government" is a vague clause and might be construed as lawful
opposition, but held them as disjunctive and separable and upheld
the statute as to the other two clauses. It sustained the conviction.'
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed 6 the
California court and held that the first clause, condemning display of a flag "as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organized government," construed by the state court as possibly
including peaceful and orderly opposition to government by legal
means and within constitutional limitations, was unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court said:
"Free political discussion to the end that the government may be responsive to the will of the people is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system. A statute
which upon its face and as authoritatively construed, is
so vague and indefinite as to permit the punishment of
the fair use of this opportunity is repugnant to the guaranty
of liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment."
It is interesting to note that the implications of this decision
extend beyond the precise issue of red flags, banners or emblems.
If anything, the holding here pointed out that the constitutional
'62

Cal. App. 788 (1930).

, Footnote 13, supra.
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guarantee extends beyond freedom of speech in a narrow sense.
Not of less importance, the decision points out that a criminal
statute may be unconstitutional for indefiniteness, which is a
frequent charactertistic of sedition laws."
In People v. Anderson, 8 the defendants were criminally
charged with -willfully and unlawfully assembling for the purpose
of disturbing the public peace in violation of the California Penal
Code.' The facts show that an organization holding communist
doctrines and known as the Trades Union Unity League called a
demonstration against unemployment. One, Olson, was making
a speech. He was told to disperse. He refused and kept on speaking, telling the police officer the streets were public. In spite of
forcible resistance, defendants were arrested. While the arrest
was being made, the crowd was shouting, "Don't arrest our
speakers." The crowds overflowed into the street and were blocking traffic.
In sustaining the conviction, the District Court of Appeal
said:
"Although public speaking is not prohibited, standing
or congregating in the streets in such manner as to block
traffic is prohibited by city ordinances. While a speaker
I' A statute making. it criminal to be a "gangster" was subsequently invalidated for vaguenessLonzetto v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451 (1939).
'8 117 Cal. App. 767 (1931).
"Penal Code, Sec 416, Deering's Penal Code of California.
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who is not himself obstructing traffic may not always be
criminally responsible for such obstruction created by
his hearers, yet when he refuses to move on request and
insists on holding his meeting at a place where his hearers
are blocking traffic, as in this case, he becomes at least
an aider and abetter, and a principal in the offense."
Local ordinances prohibiting free speech when the police
power function of preserving public order is imperiled did not
stop at this point. In 1936, the City of Los Angeles passed an ordinance prohibiting the distribution of handbills or any other printed
matter calculated to attract public attention. The ordinance 20 reads
as follows:
"No person shall distribute any handbill, dodger, commercial advertising circular, folder, booklet, letter, card,
pamphlet, sheet poster, sticker, banner, notice or other
written or printed matter calculated to attract attention
of the public."
In Kim v. Young, " the defendants were convicted of distributing handbills which bore a notice of meeting to be held under
the auspices of "Friends of the Lincoln Brigade." The Supreme
Court of California upheld the conviction of the defendants for
violating the above mentioned ordinance.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States,2 2 the
conviction was reversed and the ordinance was declared invalid.
The Court said:
"... the ordinance cannot be enforced without unconstitutionally abridging the liberty of free speech. As we
have pointed out, the public convenience in respect to
cleanliness of the streets does not justify an exertion of
the police power whcih invades the free communication of
information and opinion secured by the Constitution."
The decision in the Handbill Cases2 3 thus made the constituMunicipal Code of the City of Los Angeles, Sec. 28.01.
2533 Col. App. 2d 747 (1938).
Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 (1939), with which are grouped Young v. California, Snyder
v. Milwaukee and Nichols v. Massachusetts and referred to as the Handbill Cases. See also Lovell
v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938); rev'g. 55 Go. App. 609 (1937); and Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S.
141 (1943).
28 Ibid.
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tional protection against ordinances much wider than it had been.
It might be argued that this decision will make it rather difficult
for a city to frame an ordinance to keep its streets clean; but
perhaps this does not really matter when we think of all the
present litter which lies outside the scope of such handbill ordinances-cigarette wrappers, matchcards, newspapers. .... 24
What about ordinances supressing the house to house canvassing of ideas? Important as it might seem to expose citizens to novel
views, it might validly be argued that it is more important that
a man not be denied the right to shut himself up from hearing
uninvited strangers expound unwanted dogmas . 25 Unfortunately,
the social interest aspect of freedom of the home is weighed rather
27
lightly in the Handbill Cases 6 and Cantwell v. Connecticut. In
these cases, although the Supreme Court does not undertake to
frame the ideal ordinance, it nevertheless suggests a broad and
important guiding principle, to-wit, that the police power must
not serve as a disguise for the suppression of unpopular persons
and ideas.
The final noteworthy case of important in California which
involved a clash between Federal free speech and State police
28In that case, petitioner,
power is the case of Bridges v. California.
a labor leader, was adjudged guilty and fined for contempt of
court by the Superior Court of Los Angeles. The facts show that
while a motion for a new trial was pending in a case involving
a dispute between an A. F. of L. union and a C. I. 0. union of
which Bridges was an officer, he caused to be published a telegram
which he had sent to the Secretary of Labor. The telegram referred to the Judge's decision as "outrageous," stated that attempted enforcement would tie up the port of Los Angeles and
involve the entire Pacific Coast, and concluded with the announqement that the C. I. 0. union representing twelve thousand members "did not intend to allow state courts to override the majority
vote of its members in choosing its officers and to override the
National Labor Relations Board."
Petitioner challenged the state's action as an abridgement
of freedom of speech and of the press. The Superior Court overruled this contention and the Supreme Court of California affirmed,2 stating that in so far as this punishment constituted a
restriction on liberty of expression, the public interest in that
liberty was properly subordinated to the public interest in judicial
impartiality and decorum.
In reversing the Supreme Court of California, the Supreme
Court of the United States, speaking through Mr. Justice Black,
stated:
"What finally emerges from the "clear and present
SChafee, Free Speech in the United States 406 (1948).
1Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940); but compare Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341
U. S. 622 (1951), where the Court upheld a municipal ordinance aimed at preventing door-to-door
solicitation by itinerant salesmen.
2 Footnote 22, supra.
n Footnote 25, supra.
t314 U. S. 252 (1941).
Bridges v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 2d 464 (1940).
'
2
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danger" cases is a working principle that the substantive
evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished.
Those cases do not purport to mark the furthermost constitutional boundaries of protected expression, nor do we
here. They do no more than recognize a minimum compulsion of the Bill of Rights. For the First Amendment
does not speak equivocally. It prohibits any law abridging the freedom of speech or of press. It must be taken as
a command of the broadest scope that explicit language
read in the context of a liberty-loving people will allow."
How far may one then go in commenting on judicial proceedings? Succinctly stated, the Supreme Court has ruled that punishment by contempt violates the free speech guarantees of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments unless the publication constitutes
a clear and present danger to a fair adjudication of pending cases.2 0
NEW YORK
In People v. Most,3 1 defendant was indicted for participating

in an unlawful assembly in violation of the New York Penal
Law 2 prohibiting assemblies tending toward a breach of peace.
80See
(1947).
31 128
Most, 171
Sec.
S

also Pennekamp

v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331

(1946),

and Craig v. Horney, 331 U. S. 367

N. Y. 108 (1891); see also People v. Johnson, 62 N. Y. S. 2d 449 (1946) and People v.
N. Y. 423 (1902).
2092 subd. 3.
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The meeting took place on the day after the hanging of the Chicago anarchists. It was attended by more than eighty people in
sympathy with the defendant who openly avowed that he was an
anarchist. When the defendant entered the hall he was greeted
with "here comes our leader, Father Most." He then started to
speak and the *following are among his utterances:
"Brother anarchists, . . . the day of revolution will

come soon. First of all will be Grinnel; then comes Judge
Gary; then the Supreme Court of Illinois; then the highest
murderers of the land, the Supreme Court of the United
States.... I again urge you to arm yourselves, as the day
of revolution is not far off; and when it comes see that
you are ready to resist and kill those hirelings of capitalists."
To all this the audience exhibited its warm approval by constant cheers.
The Court held that the evidence was sufficient to show that
there was the requisite concurrence of the statutory number of
three or more persons, to have the case go to the jury. The Court
further held that the evidence was sufficient to warrant a finding by the jury that these utterances were used and understood
as threats within the provisions of the third subdivision of the
statute dealing with breaches of peace.
In Gitlow v. People of the State of New York, defendant was
indicted and convicted of the crime of criminal anarchy as defined by the New York Penal Law. Judgment was affirmed by
the Appellate Division." The New York Court of Appeals also
affirmed,3 expressly repudiating the test laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the Schenck case under the
Espionage Act,"' that words are punishable only when their nature
and surrounding circumstances created "a clear and present
danger" of wrongful acts. The facts showed that the defendant
was a member of the left wing section of the Socialist Party
which adopted the "Left Wing Manifesto" which was published
in "Revolutionary Age," the official organ of the Left Wing. A
perusal of the manifesto showed that it advocated mass industrial revolt, developing into mass political strikes for the purpose of conquering and destroying the parliamentary state and
establishing in its place, through a revolutionary dictatorship, a
system of Communist Socialism. It referred to recent strikes in
Seattle and Winnipeg as instances of new revolutionary action.
The defendant as business manager of the publication arranged
for its printing and distribution and was responsible for its circulation. The defendant contended that as there was no evidence
of any concrete result flowing from the publication of the manifesto, he was being penalized for a mere utterance in violation
of his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
In sustaining the conviction, the Supreme Court of the United
3
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States,37 speaking through Mr. Justice Sanford, held that the New
York Penal Statute" was not violative of the constitutional guaranty of the freedom of speech or press protected by the First
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment. Referring to the inflammable language of the manifesto, the Court said:
This is not the expression of philosophical abstraction, the mere prediction of future events; it is the language of direct incitement. .

.

. That the jury were war-

ranted in finding that the manifesto advocated not merely
the abstract doctrine of overthrowing organized government by force, violence, and unlawful means, but action
to that end is clear....
Casting aside the "clear and present danger" test and referring to the legislative power of a state to determine when
its own welfare is threatened, the Court then proceeded:
And the immediate danger is none the less real and
substantive, because the effect of a given utterance cannot be accurately foreseen. The State cannot reasonably
be required to measure the danger from every such utterance in the nice balance of a jeweler's scale. A single
revolutionary spark may kindle a fire that, smouldering for a time, may burst into a sweeping and destructive
conflagration ....

It cannot reasonably be required to de-

fer the adoption of measures for its own .peace and safety
until the revolutionary utterances lead to actual disturbances of the public peace or imminent and immediate
danger of its own destruction; but it may in the exercise
of its judgment suppress the threatened danger in its
incipiency. .

.

. We cannot hold that the present statute

is an arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of the police power
of the state unwarrantably infringing the freedom of
speech or press; and we must and do sustain its constitutionality.
In a strong dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Holmes, joined
by Mr. Justice Brandeis, stated that in applying the "clear and
present danger" test they found no imminent danger of a sub268 U. S. 652 (1925).
'L
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stantive evil that the state had a right to prevent. Mr. Justice
Holmes said:
If what I think the correct test is applied it is manifest that there was no present danger of an attempt to
overthrow the government by force on the part of the
admittedly small minority who shared the defendant's
views. It is said that this Manifesto was more than a
theory, that it was an incitement. Every idea is an incitement .... But whatever may be thought of the redundant

discourse before Ls, it had no chance of starting a present
conflagration.
Gitlow was subsequently pardoned by Governor Alfred E.
Smith who, after the Supreme Court decision, stopped further
prosecutions under the said criminal anarchy act.
What was the immediate effect of this decision? On the debit
side-an appraisal seemed to reveal that the "clear and present
danger" test had been abandoned and that the state was once
again in a dictatorial position regarding the exercise of free expression by its citizens. There were murmurings that the Supreme
Court had lost its vision and its courage when it permitted a
putrid hash such as the Left Wing Manifesto to terrify prosecutors, judges, and legislators. On the credit side-the two luminous
sparks on the scene that now appeared brighter than ever were
the dissenting opinions of Justices Holmes and Brandeis. In addition, the great American tradition of freedom of speech and
press now had in its arsenal two incomparable legal weapons,
namely, Justice Holmes' test of "clear and present danger" and
the Fourteenth Amendment which protects freedom of speech
under the First Amendment against abridgment by the states.
In People v. Altman,39 the defendants were convicted under
the following New York penal statute: 4"
A person, who shall display or expose to view the
red flag in any public assembly or parade as a symbol or
emblem of any organization or association, or in furtherance of any political, social, or economic principle, doctrine,
or propaganda, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
It was undisputed that the defendants had carried a red flag as
a symbol of the Young People's Socialist League and the sole
question involved was the constitutionality of the statute under
which they were convicted.
The court held, that on the authority of Stromberg v. California," the statute was void. It therefore dismissed the information and discharged the defendants.
In Winters v. New York, defendant was convicted for having
with intent to sell them
certain lewd magazines in his possession 42
in violation of the New York Penal Law.
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York
3241 App. Div. 858, 280 N. Y. S. 248 (1934).
40 Penal Law, Sec. 2095-a.
4 Footnote 13, supra.
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affirmed. 4:1 The Court of Appeals of New York also affirmed 44

and held that the conviction did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
In reversing the New York Court of Appeals, the Supreme
Court of the United States, 45 speaking through Mr. Justice Reed,
held that the statute was so vague and indefinite as to violate the
Fourteenth Amendment by prohibiting acts within the protection
of the guaranty of free speech and press.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas ignored the vagueness issue and concluded rather that the ordinance was invalid
because it was a "flagrant form" of prior restraint.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Frankfurter stressed the fact
that the statute was enacted to control crime, and publications
that incited to crime were not within the constitutional immunity
of free speech.
In Saia v. New York, the defendant, a minister of the religious
sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses was convicted of violating a
penal ordinance of the City of Lockport!" in that he used his
43268 App. Div. 30, 48 N. Y. S. 2d 230 (1944).
44294 N. Y. 545 (1945).
1 333 U. S. 507 (1946); see also Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 137 (1953), where the Court held
that States cannot constitutionally censor motion pictures on the ground that they are sacrilegious
Justice Clark, who wrote the Court's opinion, brought motion pictures within the protection of the
First Amendment by way of the Fourteenth Amendment overruling Mutual Film Corporation v.
Industrial Commissioner of Ohio, Footnote 4, supra; see also Gelling v. Texas, 343 U. S. 960
(1952), which held unconstitutional a city ordinance, the basis upon which a board of censors
refused to license a motion picture dealing with a racial theme.
" Sec. 2 and 3.
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sound equipment to amplify religious speeches in a park without
first obtaining a permit from the chief of police.4 1 Saia originally
had such a permit; but when it expired, renewal was refused on
the ground that there had been "complaints."
In reversing the New York Court of Appeals, the Supreme
Court of the United States,'4 speaking through Mr. Justice Douglas,
held the ordinance unconstitutional on its face as a previous restraint on the right of free speech, with no standards prescribed
for the exercise of discretion by the chief of police in using his
]icensing powers. There might be abuses in the use of loudspeakers,
but, if so, they would have to be controlled by "narrowly drawn
statutes" aimed at those abuses and not by giving a police officer power to deny the use of loudspeakers entirely. Unfortunately, reasoned the Court, people might allege that they were annoyed by noise when they were really annoyed by the ideas
noisily expressed. "The power of censorship inherent in this type
of ordinance reveals its vice," said the Court.
The dissenting opinions were written by Justices Frankfurter and Jackson. The Frankfurter dissent was based on the
fact that uncontrolled noise is an "intrusion into cherished privacy," in that it disturbs "the refreshment of mere silence, or
meditation, or quiet conversation." Justice Frankfurter pointed
out that during the Constitutional Convention in 1787, the Founders had shown their appreciation of the virtues of quiet by having "the street outside Independence Hall covered with earth
so that their deliberations might not be disturbed by passing
traffic."
In a characteristically vigorous dissent, Justice Jackson
thought that this was not a case involving free speech, but rather
one testing where society can exercise control over "apparatus
which, when put to unregulated proselyting propaganda and commercial uses, can render life unbearable."
In Kunz v. New York, defendant, a Baptist minister, in 1946
obtained from the Police Commissioner of the City of New York
a permit to hold religious meetings on the streets of New York
City during that year only. It was revoked on evidence that he
47 297 N. Y. 659 (1947).
4334 U. S. 558 (1948); but see Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949), where a Trenton
ordinance making it unlawful for sound trucks or similar amplifying devices emitting "loud and
raucous" noises to operate on the public streets, was upheld as constitutional.
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had ridiculed and denounced other religious beliefs in
a criminal provision of the ordinance under which
was issued. In 1948, the defendant's application for a
mit was denied and he was convicted for holding
meeting on the streets4 9without a permit. The Court
of New York affirmed.

violation of
the permit
similar pera religious
of Appeals

In reversing the Court of Appeals of New York, the Supreme
Court of the United States,"0 speaking through Mr. Chief Justice
Vinson, stated:
We have here then, an ordinance which gives an administrative official discretionary power to control in advance the right of citizens to speak on religious matters
on the streets of New York. As such, the ordinance is clearly invalid as a prior restraint on the exercise of First
Amendment rights ....

New York cannot vest restraining

control over the right to speak on religious subjects in
an administrative official where there are no appropriate
standards to guide his action.
In a vigorous dissenting opinion, Justice Jackson, stated:
The law of New York does not segregate according to their diverse nationalities, races, religious, or political associations, the vast hordes of people living in its
narrow confines. Every individual in this frightening aggregation is legally free to live, to labor, to travel when
and where he chooses. In streets and public places, all
races and nationalities and all sorts and conditions of
people walk, linger, and mingle. Is it not reasonable that
the City protect the dignity of those persons against
fanatics who take possession of its streets to hurl into
the crowds defamatory epithets chat hurt like rocks? ...
The 'consecrated hatreds of sect' account for more than
a few of the world's bloody disorders. These are explosives which the Court says Kunz may play with in the
public streets, and the community must not only tolerate,
but aid him. I find no such doctrine in the Constitution. In
this case there is no evidence of a purpose to suppress
speech, except to keep it in bounds that will not upset good
order.
Kunz v. New York 5 has been viewed as a difficultly conceived decision in view of the fact that the Supreme Court appears to have dealt unrealistically with a starkly practical prob-

19

300 N. Y. 273 (1949).
5 340 U. S. 290 (1951); but see Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U. S. 395 (1953) where the
Court held constitutional a city ordinance providing for licensing of meetings in public streets or
parks, where the state supreme court had required that the licensing system must be "uniform,
nondiscriminatory and consistent," and whereby the licensing officials had "no discretion as to
granting permits, no power to discriminate, no control over speech;" also see Cox v. New Hampshire,
312 U. S. 569 (1941) where a similar licensing ordinance as in the Poulos case (supra) was upheld
in spite of the challenged assertion that the regulation constituted a prior restraint on the exercise
of First Amendment rights of free speech. Compare Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268 (1951),
where a group of Jehovah's Witnesses who wished to give a series of Sunday Bible talks in a
public park and who were denied a permit, proceeded to hold their meeting without a permit as
a result of which their speaker was arrested and convicted of disorderly conduct. The Court
unanimously reversed the conviction as a prior restraint on speech, noting that the conduct of the
speaker hod been quite orderly and that the only basis for the charge was the failure to have
a permit.
. 31 Ibid.
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lem. The Court seemed not fully alert enough to the fact that
street preaching in Columbus Circle in polyglotted New York
City is done in a milieu quite different from preaching on a New
England village green; especially, where the evidence had disclosed that Kunz had no compunction upon prior occasions about
offending and outraging the deepest religious sensibilities of others.
What the Court seems to have done here was no more than substituting its abstract views for the informed judgment of local
authorities and local courts who are charged with the duty of
preserving the peace and discouraging hostile ideological forces
to use city streets as battlegrounds, with resulting destruction of
public order. Furthermore, the position of the Court appears
rather inconsistent when we analyze its decision in Feiner v.
New York, 5 2 which was decided the same day as the Kunz case
(supra).
In Feiner v. New York, petitioner was convicted of the offense of disorderly conduct under a New York penal statuteand was sentenced to thirty days in the County penitentiary.
The conviction was affirmed by the County Court, and the New
York Court of Appeals. 54 Petitioner claimed that his right of free
speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments was violated.
The facts disclose that petitioner made an inflammatory speech
to a mixed crowd of eighty negroes and white persons on a city
street in Syracuse. He made derogatory remarks against President
Truman, the American Legion, and local political officials, and
endeavored to arouse the negroes against the whites and urged
them to rise up in arms and fight for equal rights. The crowd which
blocked the street became restless and its feelings were rising.
After observing the situation for some time without interference,
police officers, in order to prevent a fight, requested the petitioner on three occasions to get off the box and stop speaking.
After his third refusal, they arrested him and he was convicted
of violating Section 722 of the Penal Law which in effect forbids
incitement of a breach of the peace.
In sustaining the conviction, the Supreme Court of the United
-340 U. S. 315 (1951); compare Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 (1949).
Penal Law, Sec. 722.
300 N. Y. 339 (1950).
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States, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, held that the
speaker's remarks as to whether "a clear danger of disorder"
was imminent had been weighed and affirmed by the trial and
appellate courts of the state. The defendant had a right to express his views; but free speech does not include the right to "incite to riot," said the Court.
An indication of the weakness of the Vinson opinion may
be gathered not alone from a comparison with the vigorous dissenting opinions of Justices Black and Douglas, but possibly even
more so from the fact that Justice Minton, a seemingly staunch
"police power" advocate joined with the dissenters in this case.
Justice Douglas expressed the view that a perusal of the record
showed no likelihood of riot. Justice Black felt that the majority holding made it "a dark day for civil liberties in our Nation."
Justice Jackson's agreement with this decision makes his
attitude rather difficult to understand in view of his dissent in
the Kunz case (supra) wherein he expressed the view that the
Court-approved Feiner type of police control was actually much
more dangerous than the permit system which the Court deprecated in the Kunz case (supra).
The final significant case of far reaching importance to be
dealt with in this paper, which involved a clash between Constitutional free speech and State police power, is5 the case of Adler
v. Board of Education of the City of New York. In that case the
defendants brought a declaratory judgment action in the Supreme
Court of New York, Kings County, praying that Section 12-a of
the Civil Service Law' " (which in substance provides that any
member of any organization who advocates the overthrow of the
government by force, violence, or any unlawful means is ineligible
for employment in any public school)-as implemented by Section 3022 of the Education Law5-,-(which in substance requires
the Board of Regents to adopt and enforce rules for the removal
of any employee who violates Section 12-a of the Civil Service
Law, membership of a schoolteacher in any organization labeled
by the Board of Regents as subversive being prima facie evidence
for disqualification for appointment to or retention in any school
- 342 U. S. 485 (1952).
' N. Y. Laws, 1939, c. 547 as amended, N. Y. Laws 1940, c. 564.
N N. Y. Law 1949, c. 360.
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position)-be declared unconstitutional, and that action by the
Board of Education of the City of New York thereunder be enjoined.
On motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court held that
Section 12-a of the Civil Service Law, Section 3022 of the Educational Law (hereinafter referred to as the Feinberg Law) and
the Rules of the State Board of Regents promulgated thereunder,
violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and issued an injunction.58 The Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court of New York, reversed, 59 and the Court of Appeals of New
York affirmed 0 the judgment of the Appellate Division.
The Board of Education argued that members of subversive
groups use their positions to advocate and teach their doctrines
and are usually bound by oath to advocate and teach party line
doctrine. According to the Board, this propaganda was sufficiently subtle to escape detection and thus the menace of such infiltration was difficult to measure. To protect children from such
influence, the Feinberg Law was enacted so that teachers who
practiced this subtle insemination could be disqualified after notice
and full hearing.
The defendants argued that the Feinberg Law was an abridgment of the freedoms of speech and assembly of persons employed
or seeking employment in the public schools of the State of New
York.
The Supreme Court of the United States,"' speaking through
Mr. Justice Minton, held the act constitutional. The Court said:
If, under the procedure set up in the New York Law,
a person is found to be unfit and is unqualified from employment in the public school system because of membership in a listed organization, he is not thereby denied the
right of free speech and assembly. His freedom of choice
between membership in the organization and employment
in the school system might be limited, but not his free5196 Misc. 873, 95 N. Y. S. 2d 114 (1949).
'5276 App. Div. 527, 96 N. Y. S. 2d 466 (1950).
'0301 N. Y. 476 (1950).
01342 U. S. 485 (1952). See also Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U. S. 716 (1951) and
United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75 (1947); but see Schneiderman v. United States, 320
U. S. 118 (1943), where Justice Murphy, in his opinion for a majority of five Justices, rejected the
theory of guilt by association, saying "beliefs are personal and not a matter of mere association."
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dom of speech or assembly, except in the remote sense
that limitation is inherent in every choice. Certainly such
limitation is not one the state may not make in the exercise of its police power to protect the schools from pollution and thereby to defend its own existence.
In a strong dissent, Mr. Justice Black set forth his views
in the following manner:
This is another of those rapidly multiplying legislative
enactments which makes it dangerous-this time for school
teachers-to think or say anything except what a transient
majority happen to approve at the moment. Basically these
laws rest on the belief that government should supervise
and limit the flow of ideas into the minds of men ....

a different governmental policy rests
the government should leave the mind
absolutely free. Such a governmental
varied intellectual outlooks in the belief
will prevail ....

Quite

on the belief that
and spirit of man
policy encourages
that the best views

Public officials cannot be constitutionally

vested with powers to select the ideas people can think
about, censor the public views they can express, or choose
the persons or groups people can associate with. Public officials with such powers are not public servants; they are
public masters.
Justice Douglas also dissented in a poignantly searching opinion, portions of which follow:
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The Constitution guarantees freedom of thought and
expression to everyone in our society. All are entitled to
it; and none needs it more than the teacher ....

The present

law proceeds on a principle repugnant to our societyguilt by association.... To be sure, she may have a hearing
when charges of disloyalty are leveled against her ...
She may, it is said, show her innocence. But innocence
in this case turns on knowledge; and when the witch hunt
is on, one who must rely on ignorance leans on a feeble
reed ....

The very threat of such procedure is certain to

raise havoc with academic freedom. Youthful indiscretions, mistaken causes, misguided enthusiasms-long forgotten-become the ghosts of a harrowing present. Any
organization committed to a liberal cause . . . becomes

suspect. A teacher caught in that mesh is almost certain
to stand condemned. Fearing condemnation, she will tend
to shrink from any association that stirs controversy. In
that manner, freedom of expression will be stifled ...
What happens under this law is typical of what happens
in a police state. Teachers are under constant surveillance;
their pasts are combed for signs of disloyalty; their utterances are watched for clues to dangerous thoughts. A pall
is cast over the classroom. There can be no real academic
freedom in that environment. Where suspicion fills the air
and holds scholars in line for fear of their jobs, there can
be no free exercise of intellect ....

A problem can no longer

be pursued with impunity to its edges. Fear stalks the
classroom. The teacher is no longer a stimulant to adventurous thinking; she becomes instead a pipe line for safe
and sound information. A deadening dogma takes the
place of free inquiry. Instruction tends to become sterile;
pursuit of knowledge is discouraged; discussion often leaves
off where it should begin. .

.

. It produces standardized

thought, not the pursuit of truth. Yet it was the pursuit
of truth which the First Amendment was designed to proect. A system which directly or inevitably has that effect
is alien to our system and should be struck down. Its
survival is a real threat to our way of life ...

The Framers

knew the danger of dogmatism; they also knew the
strength that comes when the mind is free, when ideas
may be pursued wherever they lead. We forget these
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teachings of the First Amendment when we sustain this law.
For the majority of the Court, duly constituted state legislatures were entitled to decide on what basis its teachers were
deemed fit as educators of its future citizens. For the minorityunable to cite legal precedent upholding their views-they turned
to argue the social unwisdom of censorship and the obnoxious
un-American principle of guilt by association.62
To a certain extent, former faded shades of the early case of
Patterson v. Colorado 3-where the Supreme Court stated that it
would not interfere with matters of local law-were again taking
on fresh color.
CONcLUSION
Which shall give way when a clash occurs between an individual asserting his constitutional right of "freedom of speech"
and a state asserting its right to act for the common weal of its
citizens under its internal "police powers"? What formulae shall
the courts use in deciding problems of free speech? Actually,
there are no royal roads leading to an easy or precise solution of
Consitutional Law problems, especially in the area of free speech
In fact, the challenge becomes most formidable when we realize
that in the free speech arena the courts are constantly confronted
with the grave task of accommodating legislative power for the
general security to the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression. At times, the contestants, with their niceties of argument
and nuances of ratiocination are even more delicately balanced
than a jeweler's scale. Nevertheless, the courts, as duly constituted judicial tribunals, must stand ready, willing, and able to
decide some of these most delicate, intangible, yet superlatively
important issues that can arise in a democratic society. They must
be creatures of the times and sensitive to the same currents of
opinion as move legislators, to the end that the standards of reasonableness by which they judge legislative action will not be
detached from reality. At the same time they must be sensitive
to the myriad human expectations which have made the American courts a type of ark within which the American conscience
reposes, with the responsibility not merely of mollifying legislatures but of fearlessly passing judgment on their actions in the
light of the great libertarian principles of the Constitution.6 4 Only
when courts realize that the principle on which speech is classified
as lawful or unlawful involves the balancing against each other
of two important social interests, namely, public safety and the
search for truth, can the true boundary line of free speech be
fixed. 5 There is no doubt that every reasonable effort should be
made to maintain both interests unimpaired. But if the great interest in free speech must be sacrificed, let it be sacrificed only
when the interest in public safety is really imperiled, and not, as
most men emotionally believe, when it is barely conceivable that
it may be slightly affected.
Alfred Bettman in Hearings before the Committee on Rules, 66th Cong., 2d Sess., on H.
Res. 438, Wash., 1920, pp. 125-128. See also John Lord O'Brian, "The Menace of Administrative
Law," 25 Reports of the Maryland State Bar Association, 1920, at p. 163.
0 Footnote 3, supra.
" Pritchett, Civil Liberties and the Vinson Court 253 (1954).
65 Chafee, Free Speech in the United States 35 (1948).
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Torts: A Limitation of the "Family Car Doctrine" in Colorado?
The essential facts presented by the record in Vick v. Zumwalt,
M. M. Vick of Loveland, Colorado was, on February 16, 1952,
the owner of a Mercury automobile. On that date, while his parents were out of town, 15-year-old David Vick took said automobile
from its garage and drove into the country with plaintiffs as his
guests and passengers. While so driving, David Vick played
"ditch em" with the driver of another car, and the Mercury he
was driving left the road and overturned. In this accident plaintiffs were injured, and as a result of these injuries this action was
instituted against the defendants M. M. Vick and David Vick.
Plaintiffs sought recovery against M. M. Vick under the "Family
Car Doctrine".
To show circumstances within the "Family Car Doctrine" the
complaint alleged "that the said motor vehicle driven by David
Vick was owned by his father, that said motor vehicle had been
purchased for family use; that the said motor vehic]e at the time
of the said negligence was being operated by David Vick solely for
his own pleasure under the general permission of the defendant
M. M. Vick; and that David Vick was a member of the household
of the defendant M. M. Vick at the time of said negligence."
The case was submitted to the jury for determination of the
issues, and for answers to certain special interrogatories submitted
by the court. We need concern ourselves with but one of the interrogatories which was as follows:
"4. Was David Vick driving the automobile at the time
of the accident with the consent of the defendant M. M.
Vick?"
Together with interrogatory number four the court instructed
the jury as follows:
* * * If you find from a preponderance of the evidence
that David Vick, on the occasion in question, was using the
automobile with the consent, either express or implied, of
his father M. M. Vick, then you shall find for such plaintiffs
'Vick

v. Zumwalt,

__ Colo .....

C.B A. Ady. Sh. Vol. 6, P. 470; 273 P. 2d 1010.
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and against the defendants David Vick and M. M. Vick
jointly. Implied consent, as used in this instruction, is a
consent arising from facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonable person to believe that consent had been
given.
The jury was further instructed that "consent" as used in the
instruction above quoted could be a general consent to the use of
the automobile at any or all times or "a special consent to the use
of the automobile on this particular occasion."
In answer to interrogatory number four, the jury found David
Vick had the "implied consent" of his father to the "general" or
"special" use of the automobile.
The Supreme Court held in reviewing the judgment of the
trial court that the instructions relating to "consent" were faulty
and constituted reversible error. In so finding the Supreme Court
said,
If the parent over a period of time permitted and
allowed his son to use his automobile and made no complaint, that might constitute implied permission for him to
use it, whether or not there was any express permission for
its use on the particular occasion under examination....
To establish the elements required to bring into operation
the family car doctrine, resort must be had to the circumstances, frequency and notoriety of operation of the automobile by a member, or members, of the owner's family.
* * * there must be consent, either express or implied, on

the part of the parent to the general use of the car, or an
express consent to the use of the car on the particular
occasion.
The court laid emphasis on the necessity of "customary or continued" use of the automobile by the child, to lead to a finding of
"implied" consent. Further, in quoting from an undisclosed source,
the court said, "Implied authority is actual authority circumstantially proved, or evidenced by conduct, * * * it is authority which
the principal intended that the agent should have."
It is clear from the language of the Supreme Court that the
circumstances of each case must show a "customary or continued
use" of the automobile by the minor child, and such "customary
or continued use" known of and intended by the head of the household sought to be charged. These are the ingredients necessary
to a formulation of "implied" consent to "general" use of the
vehicle by the child. In the absence of a showing of "implied"
consent the plaintiff would have to prove "express" consent to use
on a particularoccasion. The instruction given relating to implied
consent did not contain the necessary ingredients. It did not include
the necessary element of intent or knowledge on the part of the
parents to the use of the vehicle by the child. Although the evidence
indicated David Vick had at times used the car, it was not shown
the parents knew of this use. The state of the evidence then demanded the inclusion of the necessary element of knowledge by
the parent in the instruction. The omission was held to be error.
The court said "Implied consent cannot be shown by some conjec-
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tural situation or conclusion of the jurors or assumptions indulged
by them. It can only be shown by competent evidence, direct or
circumstantial".
Our attention should be focused on the Court's holding concerning the "Family Car Doctrine". To determine the effect of
this holding upon the state of the law concerning the "Family Car
Doctrine" in this jurisdiction, prior decisions of the court should
be reviewed.
The "Family Car Doctrine" saw its beginning in Colorado in
the case of Hutchins v. Haffner, 63 Colo. 365, 167 P. 966. In that
case a husband, who owned an automobile conceded to be kept for
family purposes, was held liable for damages caused by the negligent operation of the car by his wife. Liability was thus imposed
even though the husband was not present at the time of the accident nor in any way participated in the negligence. The court said,
A majority of this court have chosen to adopt the
doctrine that a husband is liable for an injury inflicted
by his automobile, which he purchased for family use,
while it was being operated by his wife, solely for her own
pleasure under his general permission to use the machine
whenever and wherever she pleased * * *

The court laid the theory of the husband's liability upon an
agency fiction, considered the husband-owner as Principal and the
family member-driver as agent, thus making use of the doctrine of
Respondiat Superior. The family member, in such circumstances,
is to be considered as furthering the interests of the principal by
using the auto for the purpose for which it was maintained, namely
family business or pleasure.
The doctrine as adopted in Hutchins v. Haffner, supra, was
extended considerably however in the case of Boyd v. Close et al.,
82 Colo. 150, 257 P. 1079. In that case action was brought against
the mother of one Dennis Phillips, 19 years old, and a passenger
in the car which struck plaintiff, for damages occasioned by the
automobile collision. The automobile involved, was part of the
estate of Mrs. Phillips' late husband, Dennis's father, and Mrs.
Phillips was in possession of the automobile as executrix of the
decedent's will. The evidence in the case indicated that at the time
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of the accident Dennis was not driving, but had relinquished control of the car to his friend Close who was with him on the occasion. Both boys had been to a dance and were returning home
at the time of the accident. The evidence also indicated that Close
was driving while intoxicated. The Supreme Court reversed judgment of the trial court based on a directed verdict and remanded
the case for a new trial allowing plaintiff to go to the jury on the
matter of negligence. In doing this the court held that Mrs. Phillips
could be held liable for the negligence of Dennis either in allowing
Close to drive or negligence of Close imputed to Dennis because
of a "joint enterprise". The court arrived at this conclusion by applying the "Family Car Doctrine", as declared in Hutchins v. Haffner, supra. Mr. Chief Justice Burke on delivering the opinion of
the court said, "Liability under that doctrine is not confined to
owner or driver. It depends upon control and use". He went on further to find that Mrs. Phillips had control and that the car was
kept for family use, therefore her liability was established. The
court continued saying "that Mrs. Phillips did not know of or expressly sanction the particulartrip is also immaterial.It was clearly
within the purview of the general purpose for which the car was
kept and used, and her liability is thereby fixed".
It is interesting at this point to note that the court laid particular emphasis on the factors of "control and use" of the automobile
and well nigh eliminated any necessity of finding knowledge of or
consent to the particular use by the child.
Seven years later in the case of Boltz v. Bonner, 95 Colo. 350,
35 P 2d 1015, the "Family Car Doctrine" was again applied. In
that case Mrs. Boltz was held liable as owner of an automobile
involved in a collision as a result of the negligence of her daughter
who was driving at the time. Here again the court found that the
automobile was kept for the use and pleasure of the family and
was within the definition of a "Family Car" as laid down in
Hutchins v. Haffner, supra, and Boyd v. Close, supra. The Supreme
Court held that the trial court was correct in treating the automobile as a "family car" as a matter of law when the owner of the
car testified that the car was at the disposal of the child whenever
such use did not interfere with the requirements of the owner.
The last interpretation by the Colorado Supreme Court of the
"Family Car Doctrine", immediately preceding the case of Vick v.
Zumwalt, is found in the case of Greenwood et al. v. Cecil Kier,
125 Colo. 333, 243 P. 2d 317. In that case it was held to be error
committed by the trial court in submitting instructions to the jury
concerning liability of the defendant under the "Family Car Doctrine" because, as a matter of law, there was no indication that
the automobile involved was kept or maintained for the use and
convenience of the members of the family. The automobile involved was owned by a corporation, and the evidence showed the
auto to be principally used in connection with corporation business.
Judgment for plaintiffs was reversed.
After the decision in Boyd v. Close, supra, the "Family Car
Doctrine" seemed well established in Colorado. That case extended
the doctrine to broad limits when the court said, "That Mrs. Phillips
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did not know of or expressly sanction the particular trip is also
immaterial." In Boyd v. Close there appeared to be no "general
permission" extended to Dennis by Mrs. Phillips, yet the court
found her sanction of the particular trip was unnecessary. The
cases of Boltz v. Bonner, supra, and Greenwood v. Kier, supra, did
not turn on the necessity of a consent to the use of the auto, but
merely on what was or was not a "family car". The subject case
of Vick v. Zumwalt seems definitely to limit the effect of the decision in Boyd v. Close, supra, and to limit the extension of the
doctrine created therein.
As we have seen the court has found that there must be consent, express or implied, to the use of the car by the child. Where
the elements of knowledge and consent had heretofore seemed to
be overlooked, or at least considered not to be necessary to the
decisions by the court, (indeed considered immaterial in Boyd v.
Close) they are found essential to a finding of liability in Vick v.
Zumwalt. Colorado now seems to stand with the states denying
liability where the car is taken surreptitiously and in violation of
instructions.
In summary, a review of the Colorado decisions involving the
"Family Car Doctrine" to this date seems to hinge liability on four
factors, the absence of any one of which would be fatal to the
action:
1. Right to control the use of the car vested in the defendant.
2. Auto maintained by the one with the right to control for
the convenience, pleasure and use of the family.
3. Consent to the general use, either express or implied, or
express consent to use on a particular occasion in the absence of
general consent-such consent issuing from the one with the right
to control, who maintains the auto for family use.
4. Such use on the occasion of an accident must be within the
scope of family purposes for which the auto is maintained.
-By

Richard Eason, Student, University of Denver College of Law
Mr. Eason received his B.S. degree in 1950 from the University
of Nevada and is currently a senior at the University of Denver
College of Law. He is a member of the Board of Dicta and a
member of Phi Delta Phi legal fraternity.
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